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There could scarcely be a more striking contrast than that between the 
international setting of Malaya on the eve of the World War II and that of 1953 
Between 1905 (the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War) and 1939 Asian 
nationalism had come into being and had begun its trial of strength with western 
imperialism, but there was nothing visible on the political scene on the eve of 
the World War II to suggest that in a space of less than a decade India would 
have thrown off her foreign yoke, seemingly for ever, and that China would have 
turned communist and allied herself to the USSR, or that the greater part of 
Southeast Asia would have obtained its independence from colonial rule
On the outbreak of the war of 1939 Malaya was shielded by a belief in 
Britain's sea power 1 As a matter of fact, in June 1937, the British Empire's 
defence policy in the Far East was exhaustively reviewed by the Chiefs of Staff 
in the United Kingdomm The assessment of requirements was based on two 
assumptions, namely
(a) That any threat to British interests would be sea-borne,
(b) that they should be able to send to the Far East within three months a 
fleet of sufficient strength to protect the dominions and India and 
give cover to British communications m  the Indian Ocean 2
These assumptions gave weight to the ability of the British Fleet to ensure the 
safety of Singapore, and as the fleet could arrive m  the Far East within a 
maximum period of 90 days, the defence plans for Malaya had to provide only 
against such operations as might be completed by the Japanese within that 
period The role of the garrison there was to hold on till the arrival of the 
Fleet 3
2A blow to Singapore strategy was administered in 1935 by the conclusion of 
the Anglo-German Naval agreement This agreement permitted German Naval buildup 
up to 35 percent of British strength, which meant that henceforth the greater 
part of the British Fleet would have to be kept in hone waters to meet this 
danger No doubt the threat would have been created in any case, but the 
agreement made it certain 4
General Percival has stated in his despatch that in November 1937 he made a 
careful study of the problem of defence of Singapore and prepared an 
appreciation of the plan of attack In his deductions based on that 
appreciation, he, probably for the first time,5 took cognizance of the danger 
from the north and, though a naval attack on Singapore figured prominently, the 
threat to Northern Malaya was nevertheless recognized
Gen Percival's appreciation was that Southern Thailand would be used by 
the Japanese for invasion of Malaya, and that its northern area and Johore would 
then acquire increased importance from the point of view of defence Even in 
this prognostication of landward menace to Malaya, more emphasis was laid on the 
protection of Singapore for which a larger Air Force and stronger infantry units 
were demanded as landing attacks were feared
The line of defence suggested by General Dobbie, GOC Malaya, was Johore 
River, Kotad Tinggi, Kuala Pulai River But it was not till 1940 that the old 
assumption of the availability and efficacy of the British Fleet in the defence 
of Malaya made room for the conviction that, in the altered circumstances, 
overland threat had became a major menace and that land and airforces had an 
important role to play 6
Gradually in 1940 the danger to Malaya started becoming clearer In April 
1940, Lieut -General Sir Lionel Bond, the General Officer Commanding Malaya
3Command, prepared a new appreciation on the ground that there was a possibility 
of a Japanese base being established m  Southern Thailand, and the northern 
borders of Malaya being held against a considerable force for several months 
Gen Percival also made it clear that the emerging problem was the defence of 
the whole Malaya", and not merely of Singapore and its immediate neighbourhood
With the collapse of France in June 1940, the risk to Malaya became greater 
still In August 1940 Chiefs of Staff prepared a new appreciation and held that 
the 1937 appreciation was no longer tenable and that it was not sufficient to 
concentrate upon the defence of Singapore Island, but it was necessary to hold 
the whole of Malaya 7
The Britishers assessed that Japan's aims were to exclude western influence 
from the Far East m  order to be able to control the resources of raw materials 
in that region
To achieve this object, it would be necessary for Japan to capture 
Singapore, without which there would be a potential threat to her southward 
advance It was also believed that Japan would take advantage of the war 
situation in Europe and risk an open break with the British Empire In the 
eventuality, with large commitments m  Europe, the British Empire might not be 
in a position to cross swords with Japan in the East Hence the British policy 
was to avoid open clash with Japan A general settlement, including economic 
consessions to Japan was considered desirable At the same time it was felt 
that if efforts to bring about a settlement with Japan failed, they must buy 
time and cede nothing until they are forced to and in the meantime build up 
their defences as soon as possible It was also decided that full military 
cooperation of the Dutch should also be sought 8 Since the fundamental concept 
of the British policy was to avoid war with Japan, all defence measures in
4Malaya or other areas of the Far East were conditioned by it At the same time 
a major consideration was that the security of the region from India to 
Australia was related to the ability of the British to control sea 
conrnumcations leading to these lands, and therefore strategy in the Far East 
included basing of an adequate fleet on Singapore But this was not possible 
immediately and therefore the obvious alternative was to defend the whole of 
Malaya m  order to preserve the security of Singapore It was also realized 
that the penetration of Thailand by Japanese would threaten Singapore and 
unquestionably make the defence of Malaya far more difficult by establishing 
shore-based aircraft within range of Singapore, Penang, the Malacca Straits and 
the Rangoon oil refineries as well as organizing land advance against Malaya 
from the north Moreover, there was danger to communications m  the Indian 
Ocean with its effect on the security of Malaya, based as it was on direct help 
from United Kingdom This was a new likelihood which had developed owing to the 
collapse of France and the absence of the British Fleet from Far Eastern waters 
The danger to Thailand had developed because it was easier for Japan to 
establish bases there, whether by force or by persuasion With the help of such 
bases in Thailand and Indochina it was easier for Japan to attempt a landing up 
country in Malaya and then operate southwards under the cover of shore-based 
aircraft This was more feasible than a direct assault on Singapore Hence, the 
whole aspect of defence planning had to alter, and, instead of the emphasis on 
sea-borne assault on Singapore which alone was apprehended earlier, an overland 
attack on Singapore was now to be provided against Provisions were also made 
for the defence of Borneo and the sea communications All these policies were 
based on the British perception of their economic role which was reflected m  
their strategic plans Britain was interested in Malaya's tin and rubber which
5could earn then a lot of US dollars
In 1937, the Chiefs of Staff reported that if Britain was faced with a war 
against Japan, Germany and Italy, with France as her only ally, the security of 
the United Kingdom and of Singapore would be the keystones on which the survival 
of the British Commonwealth of Nations would depend This viewpoint was also 
endorsed by the Committee of Imperial Defence and they assured that a strong 
fleet will be sent to Singapore in the event of a war but the strength will be 
decided m  a view of naval and political considerations This view was 
maintained until 1939 and in the month of March the British Prime Minister 
Neville Chamberlain while informing the Prime Minister of Australia mainatamed 
that m  the event of a war with Germany, Italy and Japan, it would still be the 
British Government's intention to send a fleet to Singapore, Britain had three 
m a m  objectives
(1) The prevention of any major operation against Australia, New Zealand 
or India
(2) To keep open Britain's sea communications
(3) To prevent the fall of Singapore
There appears to be a striking omission from all this strategic planning of 
any reference to Malaya except as a possible route for an enemy approach to 
Singapore Yet Malacca and Penang were British territories and the Malay 
States, federated and unfederated, were under British protection What was the 
meaning of "British Protection" if it did not mean defence against attack7 Yet 
we have it on the authority of General Percival, G 0 C Malaya m  1941, that the 
object of the defence was the protection of the Singapore Naval Base, and the 
holding of any part of Malaya or Singapore island was merely a means to that 
end 9
6In October 1939, when the war in the west had begun, the first Lord of the 
Admirality, Winston Churchill, was still giving the same high strategic priority 
to the defence of Singapore In a memorandum to the cabinet he said that the 
defence of Australia, and of Singapore as a stepping stone to Australia was next 
m  priority to the mastering of the main enemy fleet and that if the choice were 
presented of defending Australia against serious attack or scarificing British 
interests m  the Mediterranean, Britain's duty to Australia would take 
precedence The cabinet, however, was somewhat hesitant 10
On the other hand, if the Allies were defeated in the West, the collapse of 
British position in Far East was bound to follow Moreover, they had to 
consider their guarantees to the Eastern Mediterranean powers and the hope that 
the operations against Italy will offer prospects of early results It was thus 
a question of balancing risks, and the issue could not be decided m  advance, 
but the weakening of the British Eastern Mediterranean fleet was not to be 
undertaken lightly
This was a very different picture from 1937 when the o n o n t y  of Singapore 
was unquestioned At this point of time an element of indecision had crept in 
as the result of international developments, and the importance of Singapore was 
weighed uncertainly against that of the Eastern Mediterranean
As time went on the balance got disturbed and gradually tilted against 
Singapore In May 1940, the Chiefs of Staff reported that, in the event of 
Italy caning into the war the forces that could be sent to the east would have 
to be judged m  the light of the situation at the time Britain could not rely 
on the USA to safeguard her interests m  the Far East since they had already 
tested the American support in the incident of the closing of the Burma Road H
7Afterwards, the situation changed and the garrison of Malaya was 
strengthened by adding two battalions from Shanghai and an Infantry Brigade 
group from India The US attitude had also tilted in favour of Britain and in 
fact they made enquiries about the Singapore base and the extent to which it 
would be available to them 12
Prime Minister Churchill was of the view that the defence of Singapore 
should be based on a strong local garrison which might be relieved by a fleet, 
but that there could be no question of defending Malaya On the other hand,
C I G S , Sir John Dill, urged the need to defend the Malay peninsula from the 
Japanese, particularly the airfields from which they could attack Sir Cyril 
Newall, Chief of Air Staff, who stressed the importance of the oeninsula, on the 
grounds that if the Japanese controlled the mainland they could deny the 
facilities of the Singapore base to the British Fleet 13
In spite of all these arguments the Prime Minister Churchill did not move 
arri he felt that the danger to Singapore was negligible and maintained that a 
long range attack on Singapore would be a risky venture Here it is quite clear 
that Churchill over-estimated the 'Defensive Role' of Singapore In August 
1940,he told the Prime Ministers of Australia and New Zealand that "In the first 
phase of an Anglo-Japanese war we should of course defend Singapore, which if 
attacked - which is unlikely - ought to stand a long siege "14
On 15 December 1940, Churchill wrote to the Secretary of State for the 
Dominions that he did not view the situation in the Far East as immediately 
dangerous, and did not wish to commit himself to any dispersion of forces in the 
Malay peninsula and at Singapore On the contrary he wanted to build up as 
large as possible a fleet, army and airforce in the Middle East, and to keep 
this in a flexible state either for fighting m  Greece or to reinforce Singapore
8should the Japanese intervene But he could not hold on to his views for very 
long and the time came, in the middle of 1941, when the choice had to be made, 
and then the priorities were reversed 15
Up to May 1941 and even later, the basic strategy remained unaltered No 
less an authority than the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Sir John Dill 
was under this impression and he reminded the Prime Minister Churchill on 6 May 
1941
It is the U K therefore and not Egypt that is vital, and the 
defence of the U K must take first place Egypt is not even 
second in order of priority, for it has been an accepted 
principle m  our strategy that in the last resort the security 
of Singapore comes before that of Egypt 16
This view was also endorsed by the planning section of the Defence 
Committee The Prime Minister thought otherwise and he maintains m  his memoirs 
that he got the impression that Singapore had priority in Dill's mind 17 Further 
on 20 January 1942 he told General Ismay that 'as a strategic object, I regard 
keeping the Burma Road open as more important than the retention of 
Singapore" 18 in his memoirs he admits that he did not know that Singapore had 
no landward defences Had he known this earlier, he surely would not have 
supposed that Singapore could stand a long siege 19
Both before the Japanese invasion of Southeast Asia and immediately 
thereafter, the General Staff discounted the possibility of a major threat and 
did not want any preparations beyond the stationing of fighter squadrons and 
organizing passive air defence for the ports and docks But this complacency 
could not long continue and the rapid advance of the Japanese20 forces in Malaya
9and Burma,21 leading to the occupation by them of important naval and air bases, 
made the authorities in India fully aware of the menace facing its security 
Malaya as a part of Imperial defence was extremely vital to the security of 
India Malaya's (Malayasia and Singapore) defence was and is still vital 
primarily to India and Indonesia as controlling the oceanic routes to the 
maritime nations in general With a limited hinterland and lacking adequate 
resources for defence, Malayas defence must be the responsibility of a sea 
power, based on an area close enough to it, but possessing the necessary 
strength Only India and Indonesia appear to have the capability and potential 
to share this responsibility
*
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